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Abstract 
Aircraft accident investigation has played a pivotal role in improving the safety of 
aviation. Advances in recorder technology, specifically Cockpit Voice Recorders 
(CVRs) and Flight Data Recorders (FDR) have made a huge contribution to the 
understanding of occurrences for accident investigators. However, even these recorders 
have limitations such as the evidence they provide about pilots’ situational awareness 
(SA) or behaviours. Supplementary audio and video recording data in the flight deck 
have been discussed for many years and whilst there continues to be debate among 
regulators, operators, manufacturers and pilot unions, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) has mandated Airborne Image Recorders (AIR) from 2023. The 
purpose of installing such systems is to provide evidence of crew operational 
behaviours in terms of both human-human and human-computer interactions (HCI) on 
the flight deck. Video alone is unlikely to provide sufficient evidence for investigators. 
This study examines the additional value that eye-tracking technology may provide 
through the case study of an accident involving an Airbus A330-300 aircraft which 
experienced a rejected landing. Currently, the investigation of such events, where crew 
interaction with automation is critical to their SA, relies heavily on interview data. Such 
data may be unavailable (in the case of serious injury) or unreliable (based on hindsight 
bias). By integrating eye tracking technology into an AIR, accident investigators will 
potentially gain a better understanding of pilots’ visual scan patterns across flight deck 
instrumentation. This has implications for flight deck and procedural design as well as 
training and simulation. 
 Keywords: Accident Investigation; Airborne Image Recorders; Eye Tracking; 
Human-Computer Interactions; Visual Behaviours 
1. Introduction 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has debated the requirement for 
flight crew machine interface recordings to be included in its international Standards 
 
 
and Recommended Practices for the Operation of Aircraft (known as Annex 6) for 
many years. The objective of implementing an airborne image recorder (AIR) is to 
provide supplementary data to an aircraft’s conventional flight recorders - the cockpit 
voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) (ICAO, 2010). The cockpit image 
recorder can facilitate accident investigators in examining human performance and 
human-computer interactions (HCI) in the flight deck (Costa, 2019; ICAO, 2013). The 
US national accident investigation organisation, the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) proposed the idea of cockpit image recordings several times over the 
last 15 years. However, such proposals have largely been opposed, especially by pilots’ 
unions who typically view such technology as an invasion of privacy. This was despite 
the fact that the NTSB proposals noted that the recordings would not capture images of 
actual pilot movements, but rather would focus on capturing critical flight information 
being displayed to the pilots and system responses to pilots inputs (NTSB, 2015).  
The parameters captured by conventional CVRs and FDRs  do not provide investigators 
with accurate information of pilots’ attention distribution, SA or HCI issues relating to 
aeronautical decision-making (ADM) on the flight deck (Wang, Li, & Lin, 2017). ADM 
is defined as a systematic approach to the mental process used by aircraft pilots to 
consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of 
circumstances (FAA, 1991). ADM involves the  pilot’s visual attention in the flight 
deck, SA, choice among alternatives and risk management (Orasanu & Connolly, 
1993). Decision errors have been found to contribute to 35% of all nonfatal and 52% 
of all fatal general aviation accidents (Jensen & Benel, 1977). The techniques for 
investigating decision-making and human-computer interaction are based on subjective 
approaches, such as interviews with pilots who survive accidents or assessments based 
on an investigator’s experience if the pilots have died in the accident (Li & Braithwaite, 
2019). Research on the topic of “confirmation bias” demonstrates that human operator’s 
tend to collect information related to what they already believe (Hunt, Rutledge, 
Malalasekera, Kennerley, & Dolan, 2016). Confirmation bias is as applicable to pilots 
as it is to accident investigators, especially where evidence is limited. 
The CVR does not always provide adequate information to the accident investigation, 
as it only records audio information. Pilots may not verbalize all their actions, intentions 
or thoughts as they respond to urgent situations (Elling, Lentz & de Jong, 2012). The 
quality of pilot decision-making is a function of the tasks at hand and the dynamic 
operational environment. The application of eye-tracking technology to the flight deck 
has proven itself to be a constructive development as it can be used to identify a pilot’s 
attention distribution and SA based on human-computer interactions (Robinski & Stein, 
2013). The concept of investigating visual behaviours related to cognitive processes 
 
 
has been validated by many previous researchers including automated flight deck 
(Sarter, Mumaw & Wickens, 2007), tracing processes in decision-making (Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011), and alerting design in air traffic management systems (Kearney, Li, 
Yu & Braithwaite, 2019). ICAO’s current requirement for AIR systems to be 
implemented from 2023 does not stipulate the use of eye-tracking technology. Failing 
to include this technology would arguably miss an opportunity for investigators to gain 
a better understanding of pilots’ visual behaviours on the flight deck. This paper uses 
the case study of a rejected landing to illustrate the additional value that eye-tracking 
could bring to the accident investigation process. 
 2. Background to requirements for AIR  
Although there are differing opinions amongst regulators, aircraft manufacturers, 
aircraft operators and pilots unions regarding the implementation of cockpit/airborne 
image recorders, ICAO require aircraft weighing over 27,000 kilograms to record all 
electronic displays and flight crews operating switches and selectors after 1st January 
2023 (Costa, 2019; ICAO, 2018). The concept of installing AIR is to provide reliable 
evidence from an incident or accident which will permit investigators to assess crew 
reactions to aural/visual alerts and cockpit HCI to develop effective prevention 
strategies for aviation safety (Lik, Ates, & Uzulmez, 2018).  
 2.1 Current limitations of CVR and FDR in accident investigation 
Accident investigation reports demonstrate that CVR and FDR sometimes do not offer 
sufficient evidence to explain the contributing factors leading to an accident or incident, 
particularly when the crew perish in the event (Li & Braithwaite, 2019). Taking the 
TransAsia Airways Flight GE235 as an example, the ATR 72-600 aircraft experienced 
a loss of control and crashed into a river (ASC, 2016). Through the information decoded 
from the FDR and CVR, it was quickly discovered that the flight crew had shut down 
the operative engine eventually causing a total loss of power (figure 1). However, why 
the pilot flying (PF) misidentified the problem and shut down the wrong engine, and 
why the error was not detected by the pilot monitoring (PM) remains unknown (Wang 
et al., 2017). Had additional evidence such as the visual parameters and scan patterns 
of the crew been recorded by using eye tracking as part of an AIR, investigators may 
have developed a more complete understanding of how the flight crew interacted with 
the automated systems. 
Complexity of HCI renders it challenging to identify probable contributory factors 
leading to human–machine interaction-related incidents/accidents (Nandiganahalli, 
Lee, Hwang & Yang, 2014). The installation of flight crew-machine interface recorders 
 
 
will offer insight into the significant role pilot’s attention, decision-making, action and 
reactions with the automated system of modern aircraft influence aircraft operations (Li 
et al., 2019). ICAO’s favored approach to AIR systems is to position them so as to 
record the information which is available to the crew. Specifically it is proposed that 
the recording equipment shall not capture the head and shoulders of the flight crew 
while seated in their normal operating position (ICAO, 2018). To ensure the maximum 
contribution to accident investigation from the installation of AIR equipment there are 
certain parameters that must be captured such as the operation of all switches/selectors 
that will affect the operations/navigation of the aircraft; the primary flight and 
navigation displays; aircraft monitoring displays; engine indication displays; traffic, 
terrain and weather displays; crew alerting systems displays; stand-by-instruments; and 
if installed, electronic flight bag (EFB). 
Figure 1. GE235 key events rendered on a fused satellite image, CVR and FDR 
 
2.2 The complicated nature of HCI in the flight deck 
A common feature of accident investigations where flight crew performance may have 
been a factor is an examination of HCI in the flight deck. Information processing by 
crew is often biased towards seeking evidence that confirms their prior beliefs and 
experiences and pattern matching (Hunt et al., 2016). Despite such biases being a 
pervasive feature of human behavior, the underlying causes remain unclear and this 
remains a large challenge when investigating HCI in the flight deck (Merritt, 
Heimbaugh, LaChapell, & Lee, 2013). Understanding the nature of pilot decision-
making has emerged from epidemiological approaches to aircraft accidents and 
incidents. Pilot interaction with automated systems in the flight deck was identified as 
a significant factor in precipitating aviation occurrences (Hunter, Martinussen, 
 
 
Wiggins, & O’Hare, 2011). Many accounts of these HCI issues highlight the limitations 
of cognitive capacity in the flight deck, as pilots deal with complicated situations 
requiring enormous cognitive processing to solve the issue presented. Effective visual 
attention distributions in the flight deck is a fundamental requirement in achieving and 
maintaining SA (Prince & Salas, 1998; Wang et al., 2017; Kearney & Li, 2018). Eye 
tracking technology can provide detailed information regarding pilot’s visual attention 
shifts and SA (figure 2). Situational assessment is used as a pre-cursor to generate a 
plausible course of action, and mental simulation to evaluate that course of action for 
risk management (Endsley, 2015). A significant number of investigation reports reveal 
that inappropriate decision-making related to HCI remains a relatively pervasive factor 
associated with aviation accidents (Fulton, Westcott & Emery, 2009; ASC, 2018). 
 
Figure 2. Pilot’s attention shifts from Primary Flight Display (fixation-156) to Flight 
Mode Annunciator (fixation-157) due to mode changes recorded by eye tracker 
 
2.3 The growing need for AIR in the flight deck  
Commercial aircraft have become progressively more automated delivering benefits in 
operational efficiency and safety (Billings, 1991). However this automation has also 
created a number of operational complexities for pilots leading to safety concerns such 
as “automation-surprise” (Dekker, 2001; Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004). Avionics systems 
on advanced flight decks contain a lot of instruments with many parameters being 
recorded by FDR. However, critical safety factors such as pilot responses to abnormal 
situations and decision-making, are not recorded by CVR or FDR. Thus far, the 
techniques involved in investigating human performance and HCI are limited to 
interviews; reviews of training records; and reviews of the flight profile based on FDR 
and CVR data to draw conclusions about the operational behaviours of the flight crew.  
 
 
The Air France Flight 447 accident which occurred in 2009 with the loss of 228 lives 
is an example of where the lack of evidence relating to the human-machine interface 
(HMI) led the investigation agency, the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA), to 
report that the lack of cockpit image recorders hampered their understanding of the 
evolving situation which the crew faced. The aircraft was equipped with a FDR which 
collected far more parameters than the minimum requirements. However, evidence 
relating to pilots’ actions and responses to unreliable airspeed indications; their visual 
scan patterns of the flight deck instruments; and the degradation of avionics systems 
were not available to accident investigators. This made it difficult to make 
recommendations about the HMI or associated crew training. Other investigations 
conducted by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also found that 
FDR and CVR provide very limited information regarding crew’s actions and HCI in 
the flight deck (NTSB, 2000 & 2002). The BEA subsequently recommended that ICAO 
require passenger transport flights be installed with flight crew-machine interface 
recording systems or AIR. However, without the ability to accurately track the eye 
movements of crew, such a system may not realize its full potential.  
 2.4 Eye tracking provides complementary information to investigate HCI 
Visual behavior provides an important source of evidence to investigate HCI issues 
related to pilot’s attention distributions and SA in flight operations. Eye movements 
can be analyzed to explore the relationship between attention distribution among 
instruments and human performance in the flight deck (Ahlstrom & Friedman-Berg, 
2006, Peysakhovich, Lefrançois, Dehais, & Causse, 2018). Developing AIR systems 
that include flight deck eye tracking devices may be an alternative scientific approach 
to record detailed information for accident investigation. Previous research 
demonstrated that eye tracking technology provides additional visualization parameters 
which are closely linked to human information processing and attention distributions 
(table 1).  HCI issues leading to accidents have increased in aviation, representing a 
large gap between the functions of automation and pilot cognition (Li et al., 2019). How 
information is presented is significantly related to its readability, ease of interpretation, 
and accessibility, thus affecting pilot’s attention distribution, perception, decision-
making and safety of flight operations (Endsley, 2015).  
Table 1. Eye tracking parameters related to cognitive process and HCI 
Visual 
Parameter 
Definition Previous research 
Gaze 
The fundamental framework of eye 
movement  
Gaze might be the precursor of fixation and 
enables prompt processing peripheral 





Pauses over informative regions of 
interest 
Monitoring performance during detection 
phases (Hasse, Grasshoff & Bruder, 2012) 
Fixation 
duration 
The sum of all durations on fixating 
an AOI  
Difficulty and importance of AOIs (Kotval 
and Goldberg, 1998; Dehais et al., 2017) 
Pupil size Area of pupil dilation 
Emotion, arousal, stress, pain, or cognitive 
load (Wang, 2010; Li et al., 2019) 
Saccades Rapid movements between fixations 
Direction of a shift of attention 
(Henderson, 2003; Kowler, 2011; Salvucci 
& Goldberg, 2000) 
Saccade 
duration 
How much time to make a saccade 
between fixations 
More workload, less saccade duration. 




How fast the eyes move between 
fixations 
Slower saccade velocity as scanning on the 
related cues (McColemana & Blair, 2013; 
Li et al., 2016). 
 
There are limitations to applied eye tracking technology in the flight deck. Pilots may 
see messages on an instrument without directly fixating on them based on peripheral 
vision. Eye trackers are not able to capture peripheral vision which is significantly 
related to where the fovea fixate (Ross, 2009). Furthermore, pilot fixations do 
not necessarily equal attention or understanding (Li et al, 2019). Visual behaviours 
show only fixation points where the fovea stops to take information. Fixations alone 
do not explain the higher-level processes of comprehension and decision-making. In 
other words, recording a pilot’s eyes fixating on messages from displays 
does not necessarily mean the pilot is consciously paying attention to that element or 
comprehending it (Johansen & Hansen, 2006). This is why eye tracking data has little 
meaning by itself. Careful observation of pilot’s actions coupled with discussion by 
professional instructors is necessary to try and understand the pilot’s mental processes 
in the flight deck. Therefore, eye tracking can provide complementary data to aid in the 
accident investigation but is insufficient as an investigation tool in isolation (Ross, 
2009). 
 
3. Case study of investigating A330-300 rejected landing  
The approach of this investigation included interviews, observations, document review, 
exploring artifacts, decoding CVR and FDR to collect data and generate a report. The 
purpose of this research is to examine the current challenges in accident investigation 
as a result of the lack of detailed recorded information related to HCI and human 
performance in the flight deck.  
 
 
3.1 Background of occurrence on rejected landing 
On 1st October 2016, an Airbus A330-300 aircraft (CI-704) was on a scheduled 
international flight from Manila (RPLL) to Taipei (RCTP). At 1927 local time, the 
aircraft experienced a tail strike while the flight crew were performing a rejected 
landing on runway 23R of Taoyuan Airport. The aircraft suffered structural damage to 
the tail section as well as abrasions to the lower skin of the rear fuselage (figure 
3). None of the 137 people on board were injured; however, the affected runway was 
closed in order to complete an inspection of the surface and facilitate the removal of 
debris (ASC, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 3.  Sequence of the rejected landing tail-strike occurrence initiated by instructor pilots 
 
3.2 Description of pilots’ operational behaviours in the flight deck 
The accident occurred during the final stage of landing during main-wheel touch-down 
and while the nose-wheel was still in the air. The instructor pilot discovered that instead 
of pitching down gradually, the aircraft’s nose was instead, to his surprise, raised. This 
situation made him feel that the aircraft would become airborne again (dotted circle at 
Pitch Angle section on Figure 4). His first impression was the Training Captain’s 
performance matched comments made by other instructors in his training reports 
indicating a tendency to land with a nose up attitude after main gear touch-down. Based 
on the instructor pilot had a safety concern about a pitch-up situation and took control 
of the flight and decided to reject the landing by applying Takeoff/Go-around (TOGA) 
thrust (dotted circles at the MAN TOGA section on Figure 4). However, the instructor 
pilot was not aware that the thrust reversers had already been activated by the Training 
Captain so he could not advance the thrust levers as they were restricted by the 
interlock. The Instructor Pilot was concerned that the aircraft would not be able to land 
within 3,000 ft from the runway threshold; a company operating policy. Whilst the 
airline’s operational procedures also specified that crews must conduct a full-stop 
 
 
landing if reverse thrust had been activated, considering the uncertainty of available 
runway, the Instructor Pilot didn’t amend his decision about executing a go-around 
even after realizing the thrust reverser activation. (11:27:22 on figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. The FDR parameters and timestamp on human-computer interactions during 
rejected landing of A330-300  
 
3.3 Analyzing FDR parameters related to HCI on rejected landing 
 
 
A rejected landing is defined as a go-around maneuver initiated after a positive decision 
by the flight crew to continue to a landing below the minimum decision height for a 
particular approach. The rejected landing procedure is identical to the go-around 
procedure: Once the decision is made to reject the landing, the flight crew must be 
committed to proceed with the go-around maneuver applying TOGA thrust, they should 
not be tempted to retard the thrust levers in an attempt to resume the landing. Reversing 
a go-around decision is generally observed when the decision to abort the landing and 
to initiate a go-around is taken by the PF but is overridden by the other crew members 
(dotted circles at the Unlocked section on Figure 4). Although a rare occurrence, a 
rejected landing is a challenging maneuver conducted under time pressure, generally as 
an unanticipated and therefore unprepared situation.  
There are HCI issues relating to the instructor pilot’s decision-making in this 
occurrence. As the pilot in command, the instructor pilot was responsible for the safe 
operation of the aircraft. Therefore, he is authorized to make the final decision 
regarding all aircraft operating situations, including executing a rejected landing 
without hesitation when a safe landing cannot be assured.  In the occurrence flight, as 
the instructor pilot made his decision to reject the landing, he was supposed to commit 
to the go-around maneuver by promptly applying TOGA thrust, and not be tempted to 
resume the landing in compliance with the afore mentioned procedures. However, at 
the time he tried to advance the thrust levers he was unable as the thrust reversers had 
already been activated by the Training Captain (dotted circle at Reverser Unlocked on 
figure 4). At this point, the airline’s procedure required that the rejected landing must 
be aborted, and a full stop landing shall be completed.  
3.4 Limitations of investigating HCI on the flight deck 
Human beings are more likely to apply information that confirms their expectations. 
This information processing bias tends to occur in ambiguous circumstances (Merritt 
et al., 2013). The investigation of this rejected landing revealed the probable causes 
were related to attention distribution, SA, cross-checking, crew communication, 
decision-making, non-compliance with the standard operating procedures (SOPs), and 
confirmation bias. The data retrieved from the FDR (figure 4) validated the instructor’s 
explanation of how the occurrence of the tail strike occurred and how it reflected the 
instructor’s operational behavior. However, the data from the FDR and CVR did not 
explain why the decision made sense to the instructor pilot at that moment in time. The 
CVR and FDR data demonstrated the instructor’s non-compliance with SOPs which 
may imply a lack of operational skill and insufficient cross-checking. Investigators only 
know what pilots have done or not done and said or not said based on crew interviews 
 
 
and CVR/FDR data, there is a lack of direct evidence related to pilot’s attention, SA 
and decision-making. The inductive leap made by investigators may seem plausible 
based on the investigators’ professional experience, but it can’t be proven due to lack 
of direct evidence. For example, there is no way to prove the existence of the Instructor 
Pilot’s confirmation bias based on his reading of the Training Captains historic 
operational behaviors during approach and landing in the training records Accident 
investigation inherently requires speculation, assumptions, hypotheses and 
interpretations. The data from the FDR and CVR may not be sufficient to support or 
quash such speculations and interviews with witnesses are not always accurate or 
reliable. Therefore, it is necessary to acquire visual information from AIR, which can 
be applied to investigate human-computer interactions and pilot’s cognitive processes 
in the flight deck. 
Accident investigators replicated this rejected landing scenario using an A330 Full 
Flight Simulator and two Instructor Pilots. These simulator trials provided high fidelity 
information on the critical indicators and HCI issues in flight operations during a 
rejected landing. Therefore, investigators were able to explore effective responses and 
attentional distributions in the flight deck to make recommendations. It was observed 
that, at the time of the tail strike occurrence there was lots of information available 
which must be assimilated by the Instructor Pilot, such as the pitch attitude; air speed 
on primary flight display (PFD); the status of thrust reversers on the systems display 
(SD); warning messages on engine/warning display (EWD); the position of the thrust 
reverser levers; as well as the view outside the cockpit window to determine the 
adequacy of the aircraft attitude and stopping distance. The volume of information was 
significantly more compared to a normal landing operation. Simulator trials can 
facilitate the development of effective accident prevention strategies for rejected 
landing and go-arounds in the future.  
3.5 Complementary visual parameters facilitating A330-300 investigation 
In this A330-300 accident investigation, the Aviation Safety Council found that FDR 
data was within normal ranges before the tail strike (ASC, 2018). It became an 
important factor for the investigators who were attempting to understand why the 
instructor pilot made the decision to reject the landing, assume command and advance 
the thrust reverse levers and apply TOGA power. The synchronization of FDR, CVR 
transcript and pilots’ operational status during the rejected landing is shown in figure 
5. Due to the limited data recorded in the FDR and CVR, it is impossible to recreate the 
pilots’ attention distribution and SA during the approach and tail-strike occurrence.  
Post-accident on-scene measurement revealed that the point at which the aircraft lifted 
 
 
off left up to 7,700 ft remaining to stop.  Diverse opinions were expressed throughout 
the investigation regarding the decision-making of the Instructor Pilot and the necessity 
of his taking control of the flight. Accident and incident analyses have revealed that go-
around procedures are often imperfectly performed because of complexity and time 
pressure. This investigation clearly demonstrated that complicated HCI took place 
within the flight deck after the thrust reversers were deployed.  In view of the associated 
risks of go-around and rejected landing operational procedures and training manuals all 
contain one specific proviso that “in any case, if reverse thrust has been applied, a full 
stop landing must be made”. In a simulator study, Dehais et al., (2017) demonstrated 
that an eye tracker is a valuable tool for the explicit training of attention allocation 
during go-around to enhance aviation safety. 
An incident or accident sequence is typically made up of individual controversial 
decision points that can then be scrutinized to develop accident prevention strategies 
(Li et al., 2014). However, detailed information related to the human operators’ visual 
parameters, operational behaviors, and SA are rarely available to investigators. Based 
on figure 5, investigators can understand what happened by synchronizing FDR, CVR 
transcript and pilots’ operational status during the rejected landing / tail-strike 
occurrence. However, this data does not explain why and how the event developed. 
With the installation an eye tracking device to record pilot’s visual parameters, it would 
be possible to reproduce pilot’s scan patterns and operational behaviours. The 
investigation report concluded that the attention allocation and SA of the Instructor 
Pilot were probably affected by his confirmation bias, in that he focused too much on 
the aircraft’s attitude but neglected to monitor critical information during landing. 
Without eye tracking data there is no evidence to corroborate the Instructor Pilot’s 
explanation regarding taking control of the flight during the rejected landing. In spite 
of observations in simulation trials which were conducted during the investigation, the 
conclusions were still based on the investigators’ subjective judgment rather than a 






Figure 5. The synchronization of FDR, CVR transcript and pilots’ operational status during 
rejected landing tail-strike occurrence 
 
4. General Discussion  
Advanced flight decks lead to new safety concerns such as mode confusion and 
dysfunctional interactions between the pilots and the automation (Lee, Hwang & 
Leiden, 2015). In many aviation accidents, investigators have identified improper HCI 
as a source of incident or accident. However, due to complexity of a pilot’s decision-
making process, it is challenging to identify all points of interaction between the pilot 
and automation (Nandiganahalli, et al., 2014; Vaidya, Lee & Hwang, 2016). Various 
parameters of the automation and avionics systems such as autopilot, flight 
management system, primary flight display, navigation displays, engine indication, 
crew alerting system and communications can be recorded by conventional FDR and 
CVR. Following an accident, the investigators will extract the FDR and CVR data to 
generate a hypothesis of the probable causes of the events. However, as the A330-300 
example demonstrates, there is currently no reliable way of capturing evidence 
regarding the operational behaviours of pilots and HCI. This makes it difficult to make 
definitive recommendations regarding crew performance or the design of procedures 




4.1 AIR as a facilitator accident investigations and prevention 
Proposals on installing commercial aircraft with AIR have been discussed within ICAO 
since 1995. Repeatedly, proposals for AIR have been rejected by pilots’ unions due to 
their concerns about confidentiality. However, FDR and CVR data does not offer 
satisfactory information to explain pilot’s attention and operational behaviours in the 
flight deck. For the past 25 years ICAO has consistently recommended that AIR be 
among the standard equipment on commercial flights and it now requires that newly 
designed aircraft embrace cockpit image recorders as standard equipment from 2023 
(ICAO, 2018; Lik et al., 2018). The current absence of these recorders means that air 
accident investigators will continue to have difficulty in assessing what information 
was available to flight crew and what information flight crew were using during 
incidents and accidents.  CVRs and FDRs do not always offer investigators enough 
information to determine accident contributing (ICAO, 2018). Airborne image 
recorders can provide detailed information to support the analysis of pilot’s behaviors, 
the action taken and the consequences, though not necessarily making it possible to 
fully understand pilots’ cognitive process. The availability of AIRs would permit 
investigators produce better reports with more data and analysis, thereby increasing 
public and industry trust in respect of the recommendations formed  (ICAO, 2016). 
Furthermore, accident investigators can have a much clearer picture of what factors 
contributed to an occurrence if a cockpit image recorder could provide the pilot’s visual 
parameters. 
 4.2 Benefits of Integrated visual parameters into AIR  
The installation of AIR on the flight deck would enhance accident investigators’ 
understanding of the elements that acted as triggers to an accident including HCI issues 
between PF and PM during their cross-check.  In order to explain pilot's behavior in 
relation to occurrences, there are several human factors challenges during the 
investigation processes.  Investigators cannot make conclusions solely based on 
theories and hypotheses. Without evidence of the link between the crews’ actions and 
the aircraft's flight parameters, an investigation report will be published without an 
explanation of WHY. Current FDR and CVR are unable to provide enough data for 
HCI and pilot’s cognitive processing information, the airborne image recorder can 
provide supplemental visual data for investigators. However, there is a better solution 
to provide valuable information to investigators; by integrating eye tracking technology 
with flight crew-machine interface recorders the system could precisely identify pilot’s 
attention distribution, scan patterns, SA, perceived workload and human-computer 
interactions (left-hand side on figure 6) compared with the image recorded by crew-
 
 
machine interface recorder (right-hand side on figure 6).  
  
Figure 6. The images of PFD and ND captured by cockpit image recorder (left) versus 
pilot’s fixations on the PFD with pupil dilation taken by eye tracker (right) providing specific 
information related to Human-Computer Interactions in flight operations 
 
Visual attention can offer deep insights into HCI in the flight deck. AIR with eye 
tracking provides valuable data to better understand pilot’s performance (Dehais et al., 
2017). Eye trackers can provide the opportunity to investigate the relationship between 
pilot’s attention shifts and cognitive processing during flight operations (Ahlstrom & 
Friedman-Berg, 2006). Pupil dilation can be used for assessing a pilot’s perceived 
workload and cognitive process based on physiological parameters (Ayaz et al., 2012; 
Li et al., 2016). Visual behaviors are automatic responses which may be linked to pilots’ 
decision-making (Kuo, Hsu, & Day, 2009). AIR integrated with eye tracker can record 
different aspects of pilot’s ocular behavior, such as the number of fixations, dwell time, 
and the dilation of pupil across the various cockpit displays. The lack of this 
information in the A330-300 tail strike as a result of a rejected landing results in the 
absence of crucial information to further enhance safety and crew training.  Eye 
tracking technology has proved effective at detecting cognitive states, fatigue, 
attentional tunneling and automation surprise (McKinley, McIntire, Schmidt, 
Repperger, & Caldwell, 2011; Régis et al., 2014). Furthermore, eye tracker will not 
breach pilots’ privacy concerns compared to the cockpit video recorder. The eye tracker 
is simply to monitor pilot’s monitoring of the aircraft systems and state. There is 
considerable research available demonstrating that integrated eye tracking devices in 
flight simulators can significantly improve pilot’s training, and facilitate 
incident/accident investigation (Van de Merwe, Van Dijk, & Zon, 2012; Peysakhovich 
et al., 2018). 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The value that FDRs and CVRs provide to accident investigation is not in question, 
however FDR and CVR data has limitations in exploring human-computer interactions. 
An AIR system that includes eye tracking offers complementary visual information to 
investigate pilots’ cognitive processes on the flight deck. This can help fill in the gaps 
of FDR and CVR data in regarding flight crew interactions and HCI.  AIR integrated 
with an eye tracker is a tool which could also assist airlines to improve pilot’s 
monitoring performance.  Furthermore, the inclusion of an eye tracker does not breach 
pilots’ privacy as it tracks eye movement only rather than facial expressions. There are 
some research limitations due to regulation and certification requirement for equipment 
on the flight deck.  Any new device/sensor must be certified and approved by the 
appropriate civil aviation authority before installation in the cockpit, this was beyond 
the scope of this research paper. We can only conduct trials of rejected landing 
scenarios using a flight simulator. There is no empirical eye tracking data available to 
be compared with CVR/FDR data in the real-world operations. However, as authors we 
wished to prompt a discussion and consideration of the deployment, application and 
certification of eye tracking technology on the flight deck. We believe that the aviation 
industry could reap benefits from the addition of this technology as it can enhance both 
accident investigation and pilots’ training in the future. 
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